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Introduction
,,Truth commission has failed." - ,,Most people believe truth body harmed race relations".
These were headlines of South African newspapers, after the newspaper Business Day
published a public opinion survey on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in July
1998.' The survey was like fresh meat dropped in the lions cage of starved Truth Commission
critics. The Afrikaans weekly Rapport felt confirmed: ,,The non-refreshing nature of a
commission that has striven for two years for so-called truth and reconciliation has fortunately
found an end", wrote the newspaper. ,,Rapport has from the very beginning warned [...] that
this commission will not achieve reconciliation. [...] There was less racial tension before the
commission than now, after the commission".2
Public opinion surveys are always in danger to be superficially and uncritically used for
political purposes. The political discourse on public opinion surveys is often as interesting as
the findings of the survey results themselves. Results are either embraced as a confirmation of
certain policies or if they show negative trends much effort is spent criticising the
methodology or the conclusions drawn from the data.
This paper is an attempt to do a little bit more justice to the TRC than judging it on the
basis of a single question in a public opinion survey. In fact, survey research on the TRC is
says often less about the TRC, than about the respondents. How do ordinary South Africans
deal with the TRC process and the apartheid past? What are their feelings on amnesty,
compensation and reconciliation? Have South Africans been able to find more common
ground in the light of the TRC process? I do not want to be misunderstood. I do not write this
paper with the intention to blame South Africans from specific population groups, but I think
that a mirror might be helpful to spot the scars of the past that have remained on the face of
South African society.
I have entitled this paper 'Common Past, Divided Truth: The South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission and public opinion'. Critical readers may ask, is there indeed a
common past in South Africa? Does a common history exist at all? Is history not about
remembering and remembering not always a selective process, in which certain events are
commemorated and others forgotten? Why talking about a common past, especially in South
Business Day. 27 July 1998.
Africa? Did apartheid not forcefully entrench difference? What does growing up in the
wealthy northern suburbs of Johannesburg, an Afrikaner dorpie in the Karoo, the shanty
towns of the East Rand and the kraals of Natal have in common? And is historical experience
in relation to apartheid repression not divergent among South Africans from different
backgrounds? Of course, apartheid has affected everybody, but differently and statistically it
were black South Africans who suffered most.
When speaking about a common past I would like to emphasise that although apartheid
was experienced differently - all South Africans will remain confronted with the recent history
of repression and inhumanity for a long time. Even future generations that never experienced
apartheid, nor have any personal responsibility for past injustices, will be confronted with this
legacy. Authoritarian regimes might develop sophisticated methods of torturing, killing and
making people disappear, but they can never succeed extinguishing their deeds. The
experience of human rights violations will continue to live on in the lives of the survivors,
their friends, relatives and children. Past atrocities will haunt the consciousness of perpetrators
and by-standers for decades and will surely remain a topic of public discourse and moral
reasoning in South Africa - even in fifty years time. The apartheid past will not disappear as a
common topic of debate. Every South African will be forced to relate in one or the other way
to this common past, which transcends personal experience. This is the common past I am
speaking about.
Let me turn to the second part of the title: 'Divided Truth'. Do I want to say that there is
no truth? Or is this another trendy essay of misunderstood post-modem thought, that makes
one feel that normative standards and factual realities have ceased to exist, that the past is only
about perception and imagination? Although I concede that what human beings regard as the
'past' is always a cognitive representation - a representation that can be constructed and
changed through public myths and historiography - nevertheless I do not want to fall into the
trap of post-modem indifference. Not all interpretations of the past have the same right to be
accepted. Public perceptions are not necessarily proper accounts of reality. Uncritical
glorification of the so-called benefits of separate development and images of a 'clean' and
always heroic liberation struggle should be challenged. I am speaking about 'divided truth'
rather to draw attention to the empirical fact, that public perceptions of the apartheid past
continue to differ.
:
 Rapport, 2 August 1998 (translation by the author).
A pluralism of historical perceptions is not inherently bad. Democratic societies are not
characterised by a single or imposed account of national history that is beyond rational
argument. To the contrary, an active and ongoing discourse about the past and its moral
implications is an indicator for a vital democracy. National unity and reconciliation is
however impossible on the basis of completely incompatible tales of the apartheid past.
Justifications of the apartheid system and past human rights abuses question the basic
commitment to the new democracy and its fundamental values entrenched in South Africa's
new constitution. Secondly, it is impossible to build interpersonal trust between those who
suffered and those who benefited from the apartheid system, when past injustices are ignored,
justified or denied. As long as moral judgements about the apartheid past differ
fundamentally, and as long as there is no consensus about the commitments that have to be
made to alleviate past injustices, South Africa's political culture will remain deeply
fragmented across various ethnic and political divisions.
In the following I am going to present some results of a forthcoming bigger study on the
public perception of the TRC process that will be published by the Centre for the Study of
Reconciliation and Violence. This paper is based on various public opinion surveys from most
South African polling and market research institutions. Before turning to the empirical
findings I will give an overview on the conducted surveys and make some critical remarks
about the benefits and limits of public opinion surveys related to the TRC process.
Quantitative Research on the TRC - Its Benefits and Limits
Already before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission started operating, South African
polling institutions asked questions on the issue of past human rights violations. Public
opinions on the Truth Commission were surveyed regularly since the proposal to establish
such a commission was made by the Minister of Justice in June 1994. Most of these
quantitative studies were not exclusively aimed to assess public opinions about the Truth
Commission. To date only one quantitative survey has been conducted with predominant TRC
focus (Theissen 1997, Theissen & Hamber 1998). Due to financial constraints this survey was
however limited to the white population group only. Most surveys touching the topic of the
TRC were run in multibus-format. These are surveys run regularly and covering multiple
issues, of political or commercial nature.
The methodology of these multibus surveys is of high standard. They usually use area-
stratified samples of 2.000 and more respondents from metropolitan, urban and rural areas,
from people living in formal and informal settlements. Interviews are conducted face-to-face
and in the home language of the respondents.
There are however some problems attached to the analysis of the data of these surveys. As
public opinion research on the TRC has largely been conducted in an ad-hoc and unsystematic
manner, questions asked on similar topics were worded differently by various polling
institutions. This poses some difficulties to provide for reliable trend analysis on the publics'
view of the TRC . There has unfortunately been no attempt to ask a coherent set of questions
related to the TRC or the apartheid past, before, during and after the public hearings of the
TRC. Although all surveys were designed by experienced empirical researches, it was
sometimes impossible to prevent flaws in the wording, like loaded questions or unclear
response alternatives.3
A general limitation of quantitative survey research is that you only get what you ask for.
Questions posed may not necessarily reflect the topics that are most relevant to the
respondents. The main focus of the public opinion surveys conducted in South Africa on the
TRC has been on the impartiality of the truth commission and public opinion about the
amnesty process (Idasa 1994; MRA 1996 & 1998; HSRC 1995, 1996; Mark Data 1997;
Research Surveys 1996. 1998). Often questions have been asked on, whether the truth
commission has been able to promote reconciliation (MRA 1996 & 1998; HSRC 1996; Mark
Data 1997; Research Surveys 1998). However, only few questions have asked whether the
TRC will succeed or has succeeded in unveiling past human rights abuses (HSRC 1995;
Research Surveys 1998). The issue of reparations has not only been marginalised during the
TRC process, it has also been largely neglected in public opinion research. Only two surveys
asked questions on compensation (Theissen 1997, HSRC 1995). Related topics, such as land
restitution and affirmative action have however featured in various surveys.
A HSRC survey in 1996 asked for example ..In dealing with alleged crimes of the past, which of the
following possibilities do you prefer?" and gave the following alternatives: 1. Amnesty, 2. A Commission of
Truth and Reconciliation, i. No action by the government. As the amnesty committee is an essential pan of the
TRC, ihe alternatives are not distinctive. Does somebody who endorsed ..amnesty" now favour a general
amnesty, or just the TRC amnesty process. It is left to imagination what respondents might have thought who
endorsed the option no action by the government'. Does that mean that they are against amnesty and therefore
support criminal prosecutions or does it mean rather the opposite: no inquiry into past human rights violations
and no prosecutions at all.
There is also scant quantitative empirical research into public perceptions of the apartheid
past. Although the transcripts of various TRC hearings provide us with voluminous qualitative
material from people who were in mostly directly involved or touched by the past political
conflict, we do not know much about the divergent public images of recent South African
history in large. I should however mention here the outstanding work of James Gibson and
Amanda Gouws (1998) on blame attributions related to past human rights violations, that I
will discuss in this paper.
Some surveys have not dealt with the TRC at all, but provide us with deeper knowledge
on topics closely related to the TRC. For example, the Community Agency on Social Enquiry
(CASE) has conducted surveys on public attitudes towards human rights and socio-economic
rights (CASE 1998a,- 1998b). More recently, in April 1999, a ..Reality Check" survey
covering the issues of national reconciliation and trust between racial groups was published in
the newspapers belonging to the Independent Newspapers group.
While most quantitative studies provide us with limited information about the response of
people directly involved in the TRC process, like survivors, amnesty seekers or ex-
combatants, they do however give us a representative perspective of public opinions held by
South Africa's main population groups. The results of public opinion surveys will provide us
with a better understanding of the impact of the TRC on South African society. This will
especially be true if they are combined with findings from qualitative studies like the research
done with survivor-groups (Hamber, Mofokeng,. Van der Merwe 1998) or case studies on the
public interaction and perception of the TRC in Diepkloof, Soweto (Arnold & Dierks 1998) or
in Duduza on the East Rand (Van der Merwe, forthcoming).
I have used 'race' as an important category analysing the data of the surveys. This can
easily be misunderstood as perpetuating racist classifications used by the apartheid system. I
use 'race' as a variable, because the racial classifications of the past have shaped the way the
apartheid past and the new South Africa are experienced tremendously. This should not divert
attention from the fact that there is often more variance among the opinions and attitudes of
people belonging to one category than between people of different background. There are
also major differences between and inside various linguistic and cultural subgroups, like
English- and Afrikaans speaking whites.
Empirical Findings
In the following I will present results related to four main topics: The first question is
whether the TRC did in fact reach the public at all. And whether the TRC process followed
differently by white and black South Africans? Secondly, survey results on the public
acceptance of the TRC approach are presented. The question how the apartheid past is
experienced and reflected is discussed thereafter. Finally, I will touch the question of public
attitudes towards the amnesty process. I will unfortunately not be in a position to present you
with the whole range of public opinion research on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
This paper will also not address the question whether the TRC process was sufficient to
promote justice, reconciliation and a human rights culture in South Africa. For a more
encompassing overview I would like to refer readers to my forthcoming research report
(Theissen, forthcoming).
Public Interest In the TRC
Sometimes it was claimed that the TRC process was a 'circus for intellectuals' that would
leave most South African untouched. Although one has concede that the priorities of most
South Africans are jobs, security, housing and water, and not necessarily the TRC and the
apartheid past, it would be wrong, to state that the TRC process was unimportant to most
South Africans.
The TRC was a very successful media event. The Commission was present in the morning
newspapers on radio and TV, during lunch time and dinner talk. Daily newspapers like the
Business Day ran about 1,4 Articles on the TRC per each issue for a period of three years
(1996-1998). There was extensive broadcasting on the TRC on most South African radio
stations, and the TRC often featured daily on the evening news. From the 21st of April 1996
to the 29th of March 1998, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) aired
regularly the Special Report on the TRC every Sunday. For two years Max Du Preez and a
team of young journalist reported weekly on the activities of the TRC. Besides reports on the
TRC hearings, these broadcasts included interviews with persons involved in the process and
documentary footage of the events under investigation.
Although public interest in the TRC process was never directly measured, such data can
indirectly be obtained through an analysis of the average ratings of the TRC Special Report.
It is obvious that those who switched on their television to watch the lengthy Special Report,
were interested in the TRC and the historic events it recaptured. Otherwise people would have
switched off their TV or tuned in another channel. Although the data does not provide any
information on how the activities of the TRC are perceived, it provides us reliable information
whether the TRC process indeed reached ordinary South Africans. The data also shows how
public interest in the TRC proceedings developed over time. Findings based on TV viewers
are of course not completely representative for all South Africans, as many South Africans
have still no access to a television at home. Television is however a very popular medium
outside impoverished rural areas.
The television viewing behaviour is continuously monitored electronically for the SABC
and the South African Advertising Research Foundation (SAARF) from a representative
sample of 2.259 adult South Africans. As only TV owners with electricity at home, are
polled African viewers in rural areas, hostels and unserviced informal settlements are
underrepresented.
The AMPS-meters measure 'average ratings'. These ratings reflect the percentage of the
sampled television viewers, that have switched on a specific channel on their TV. The data is
then used to calculate relative reliable estimates how many people from different population
groups view specific programmes and advertisements.
Figure 1 records the data of all TRC Special Reports aired on SABC 3 and SABC 1 from
1996 to 1998. The Figure is split into three parts, as the Report was broadcast on different
channels and time slots. Firstly, the TRC Special Report was broadcast at 18.45h on the
English language channel SABC 3. A channel offering ,,quality shows" according to the
public broadcaster. After January 1997 the Special Report was aired on SABC 1, a channel
which features news in African languages and more entertainment. During the first nine
months of 1997 the program was aired on SABC 1 at prime time at 20.00h; and in the end,
from October 1997 to March 1998, the broadcast was screened on the same channel two hours
earlier, at 18.00 h.
The TRC Special Report often found its way into the Top 10 favourite programmes of the
week. During the first year the report was watched by 1.3 to 1.1 million adults per week (see
Table 1). This figure finally dropped to an average of 510.00 people, after the program was
finally moved to the 18.00 h slot on SABC 1 at the end of 1997.
The extend of public interest in the TRC process may be best understood, if one compares
the TRC Special Report ratings with those of other broadcasts. During the first months of the
TRC process white South Africans switched the Special Report nearly as often on, as for the
English 20.00 h news. Screened at 20.00h on SABC 1, the Special Report reached ratings
among African people similar to their ratings of evening newscasts in African languages.4
While viewing was evenly distributed between male and female citizens - the average rating
was 8,6% for male and 8,8% for female persons - the TRC Special Report was seen more
often by elderly people (see Table 1). This age difference must probably be attributed to the
fact that elderly people spent their Sunday evenings more often at home as they do engage
less in recreational activities outside their domicile. Viewing peaked among Sotho-speaking
people. Here the average rating reached 15,2 percent for the whole period between April 1996
and March 1998.
See the weekly AMPS Meters published by the South Afiican Advertising Research Foundation.
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Table 1: Average Ratings of the TRC - Special Report, 1996-1998
Period
Station. Timing
All Adults (+16 years)
African
Coloured
Indian
White
16-24 years
25-34 years
35-49 years
+ 50 years
Mean Percentage of People Watching the Special Report on the TRC
Apr-Dec 1996
SABC 3
10.2 %
13.0%
10.0%
8.1 %
7.0 %
7,7 %
8.8 %
11.4 %
12.9%
, 18.45 h
1,16 mil.
0,67 mil.
0,17 mil.
0,09 mil.
0,24 mil.
0,27 mil.
0,21 mil
0,30 mil
0,38 mil.
(Adult Viewers in Million People)
Jan-Sep 1997
SABC1
9.6 %
17,9%
2,4 %
3,9 %
2.8 %
7,6 %
9,5 %
9.8 %
12.0%
, 20.00 h
1,10 mil.
0,92 mil.
0,04 mil.
0,04 mil.
0,10 mil.
0,26 mil.
0,23 mil.
0,26 mil.
0,35 mil.
Oct '97 •
SASC1,
4,4 %
7,0 %
2,9 %
2.4 %
1.7%
3,5 %
4,0 %
4,6 %
5,7 %
Mar'98
18.00 h
0.51 mil.
0,36 mil.
0,05 mil.
0,03 mil.
0,06 mil.
0,12 mil.
0,10 mil.
0,12 mil.
0,17 mil.
Apr'96 -Mar '98
(Whole Period)
8.7 %
13,7 %
5,4%
5,1 %
4,1 %
6,7 %
8,4%
9,3 %
11.0%
1,00 mil.
0,71 mil.
0,09 mil.
0,06 mil.
0,14 mil.
0,23 mil.
0,20 mil.
0,24 mil.
0,33 mil.
Source: SABC Research Department
White. Coloured and Indian interest in the TRC proceedings remained constantly lower
than that of African viewers. This trend was reinforced, when the decision was taken to screen
the Special Report on SABC 1. The program was now screened parallel to the English 20.00 h
news on SABC 3. Average figures for whites dropped significantly from seven to 2,8 percent,
where they largely remained until September 1997 (see Figure 1 and Table 1).
Among Africans average ratings increased to about 16 to 21 percent, as the program was
now screened during prime time on SABC 1, the favourite TV channel of black South
Africans. While one may congratulate the SABC for moving the Special Report to prime time,
the decision increased the already unevenly distributed viewing patterns between African,
Coloured. Indian and White South Africans. The TRC's aim to educate all South Africans
about past human rights violations through the media was now more difficult to reach.
It should be said, that the higher average ratings among of African viewers (see Figure 1)
reflect in part different media consumption patterns between black and white South Africans,
which are generally held. While average ratings among white South Africans seldom exceed a
rate of 13 percent, the most popular programmes reach 22 and more percent among Africans.
Although public interest in the TRC dropped from 12,5 percent to 9,5 percent during
1996. the Special Report could maintain a very big and stable audience over time, especially
among black South Africans. This is clearly a sign that the TRC went to the heart of many
South Africans. Only the non-African minorities preferred to switch off their television, after
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following the process closely in the beginning. The TRC-Special Report will nevertheless be
remembered as was one of the most successful non-entertaining programs ever screened on
South African television. The classes of the 'biggest public history lesson' of the country were
indeed packed, when they were screened to South Africans at home.
Public Acceptance of the TRC Approach
Already before the TRC was starting to work, public opinion on whether past human
rights violations should be investigated or not was split along historical cleavages. A first
survey, conducted in August 1994 by IDASA showed that 60% of all South Africans were in
favour of "a Commission to investigate crimes that occurred under the previous government"
(Figure 2). However, support varied strongly between the different population groups. While
65% of all Africans supported the establishment of a TRC, only 39% of white South Africans
were in favour of it, while 40% opposed.
Figure 2: Should there be a Commission to investigate crimes that occurred under the
previous government? (August 1994)
percent
100% .
80% |
60% !
i
40% .
20% !
0% :
26
14.8
•V:
44:7
$
21.4
17.6
31.6
20.5
-21.-3 -
31.3
28.5
Total While Coloured Indian Black
• Should definitely not be an attempt to investigate them
I Should be no attempt to investigate them
Q Don't know, undecided
• Should be an attempt to investigate them
a Should definitely be an attempt to investigate them
Source: IOASA. August 1994
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A later survey conducted by the HSRC in May 1995 confirmed these patterns of opinion.
Forty-three percent of all South Africans were in favour of the establishment of a TRC, with
only 27% opposed to it. But while the majority of black South Africans supported the
establishment of a TRC. around 53% of all white South Africans rejected it. (see Table 2).
Table 2: Are you in favour of the establishment of a TRC? (All South Africans, May 1995)
yes
no
don't know
white
(N=445)
35%
53%
12%
100%
asian
(N=158)
31 %
28%
40%
99%
coloured
(N=219)
25%
3 1 %
44%
101 %
black
(N=1407)
48%
20%
32%
100%
total
(N=2229)
43%
27%
30%
100%
Source: HSRC, May 1995
Support for a TRC was especially strong among supporters of the ANC and lowest among
supporters of the DP and the Afrikaner Freedom Front, (see Figure 3).
The rejection of the TRC was significant higher among Afrikaans-speaking whites (59%)
compared to English-speaking whites (48%). White students were the only group within the
•white community to favour the establishment of a TRC, with 53% supporting the TRC and
35% opposing it.
Figure 3: Are you in favour of the establishment of the Truth Commission?
ANC PAC DP FF
Source: HSRC. May 1995
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Nearly two out of three white South Africans viewed the establishment of a TRC with
mistrust. Sixty three percent doubted whether the TRC would be able to find out what really
happened with regard to human rights violations (Figure 4). The expectations of black South
Africans were quite different. Seventy-two percent were confident that the TRC would be able
to accomplish this task.
Figure 4. Do you think the TRC will be able to find out what really happened with
human rights violations? (May 1995)
ptrcant
ao ,_
Asian Black
g Don't know
Source: HSRC. May 1995
Results from a survey conducted in June 1996 confirm that the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission was the first choice of most South Africans. 'Amnesty' or 'no action by the
government' ranked second and third (see Figure 5.1).
It must be stressed that the response alternatives given by the July 1996 HSRC-survey are
unclear. Firstly, the TRC process also entails amnesty for past political crimes. Secondly
responses like 'no action by the government' must not necessarily reflect the belief that
impunity should continue. Respondents could have had in mind that the ordinary course of
criminal justice should prevail. Although the granting of amnesty was less popular than the
TRC. there is some agreement among all population groups that amnesty should not be ruled
out. One out of three respondents mentioned amnesty as first choice and nearly every second
respondent (47 percenti as a second choice (see Figure 5.1 and 52). More recent survey data,
however, demonstrates considerable disagreement across the South African society, on which
conditions amnesty may be granted and who should benefit from it. I will come back to this
later.
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Figures 5.1-3:
In Dealing With Alleged Crimes of the Past,
Which of the Following Possibilities do you Prefer?
rj Amnesty Q N O Action ByGovernment
First Choice
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African Coloured Indian White
Source: HSRC, June 1996
© Gunnar Theissen
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The option 'no action of the government', probably interpreted by most respondents as a
'no' to criminal and other investigations into past human rights violations, was chosen by 37
percent of white South Africans, followed by support for amnesty (33 percent) and the TRC
(31 percent). White opinion was considerably split on this issue. It should be noted that forty-
seven percent of white South Africans ranked 'no action by the government' as last.
Resistance against a 'forgive and forget' approach to past atrocities is strongest among
African respondents. Two out of three black respondents (65 percent) ranked it as the least
preferred solution to the legacy of past atrocities (see Figure 5.3). The choices of coloured
people and South Africans of Asian origin reflect in general the response patterns of their
African fellow citizens.
There was relative consensus among all South Africans that the TRC hearings should be
held in public (HSRC 1995). Seventy percent of all African respondents, and every second
white respondent supported this view. Only about 14 percent of all respondents preferred in
May 1995 that the TRC should operate behind close doors.
Experiences under Apartheid and Perceptions of the Apartheid Past
The magnitude of pain and injury caused by apartheid goes beyond the many stories told
to the Truth Commission. Apartheid was a everyday experience and the injuries caused were
more complex than those which felt under the narrow definitions of gross human rights
violation, that were the focus of the TRC. In the second quarter of 1996 James Gibson and
Amanda Gouws (1997) asked a representative sample of South Africans to record the
different injuries and restrictions they experienced under apartheid (Table 3).
The assault of apartheid was experienced predominately by the black population,
especially by African and Coloured people. Nearly one out four Coloured South Africans had
to move their residence because of apartheid laws, about one out of six African respondents
reported being assaulted by the police and one out of ten African interviewees said they had
been detained by the authorities. Apartheid repression was a common feature in the life of
manv non-white South Africans.
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Table 3: Injuries experienced during the apartheid era
Here is a list of things that happened to people under apartheid. Please tell me which, if any, of these
experiences you have had.
Injuries from apartheid African
Percentage reporting
Coloured Indian White
Required to move my residence
Lost my job because of apartheid
Was assaulted by the police
Was detained by the authorities
Was imprisoned by the authorities
Was psychological harmed by the authorities
Was denied access to education of my choice
Was unable to associate with people of different
race and colour
None of the above
Profited from the system
15,9%
16,3%
16,6 %
10,2 %
6,8 %
18,5%
39,3 %
24,2 %
11,3%
11,3%
7,7 %
5,6 %
12,5%
24,6 %
18,6 %
4,5 %
3,3 %
1,9%
0,4 %
12.3 %
24,2 %
1,4%
1,8%
1,6%
0,6 %
0,6 %
3,7 %
1,4%
47,3 % 37,1 % 35,7 % 14,5 %
36,9% 48,4% 53,7% 82,3%
1,7% 5,2% 4,5% 18,9%
From: Gibson & Gouws (1997), April-June 1996
Further, about one quarter of Coloured and Indian respondents, and 39 percent of all
African interviewees reported to have been denied access to education. Loss of job and
psychological harm were also frequently mentioned by black respondents. Among white
South Africans only the restrictions placed on social life and psychological harm were
reported by over two percent. The prevention of social interaction, was however mainly felt as
a harm by non-white South Africans. Only 14,5 % of all white respondents mentioned this as
a restriction. Either white South Africans did not experience social interaction as restricted, or
they were just less interested in sharing their time with people from different racial and
cultural backgrounds.
About four out of five (82 %) white South Africans did not report any physical,
psychological and social harm experienced under apartheid. There are also significant
proportions of African. Coloured and Indian South Africans who do not report any injury.
At the same time only few (18,9 %) white South Africans reported to have profited from
the apartheid system. Only a small section of white South Africans believes that they have
indeed been beneficiaries of the apartheid order. This perception contributes to the 'white'
resistance against redistribution measures, (see Figure 6).
Figure 6: IK
Support for Redistribution
Respondents were classified as being 'for' redistribution if they said yes
to more than half of the statements below
Percentage supporting the statement:
All African Coloured Indian White
People who were forced off their land should get their land back or „
get compensation for their loss. °
Workers on farms should be given their own land on the farm.
Government must ensure that all people have adequate housing,
even if people cannot afford to pay for it.
Services like water should be provided free for poor people. 65 %
Businesses should pay more taxes to help the poor. 53 %
Wealthy suburbs should subsidise services for poorer areas. 49 %
7 2 %
5 7 %
93%
88%
62%
72%
62%
55%
89%
71 %
66%
65%
64%
46%
82%
59%
73%
48%
9%
27%
67 % 38 %
64% 16%
29 % 14 %
Source:
Reality Check,
November 1998
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Many white South Africans are at the same time inclined to regard jthemselves as the
victims of the new democratic order. Nearly half (45 %) of all white respondents claim that
life under apartheid was better, although only few of them had to make major sacrifices under
the new order. Only 14 percent claim the opposite (Table 4). '
I
Table 4: How would you judge your life under apartheid compared to now?
i
i
We are interested in your experiences under the old system of
apartheid. In general, how would you judge your life under
apartheid compared with now? '
a lot a little about the same a little a lot
better better don't know worse worse
(+4) (+2) (0) (-2)j (-4) mean
African
Coloured
Indians
Whites
6,9 %
13,8%
14.2%
25,2 %
18,6%
20.7 %
20.9 %
19.8 %
22.0 %
26.8 %
28,4 %
39,7 %
9,5%
13,4 °/o
14,6%
9,6%
43.0 %
25,2 %
19.0 %
4,3 %
-1,26
- 0,31
- 0.07
+ 1,04
Source: Gibson & Gouws (1997), April-June 1996
While Coloured and Indian South Africans are spilt whether life was better under the old
system or new system of government, most African respondents articulate that life under
apartheid was worse. 43 percent say that life was a lot worse. The attitude towards the
I
apartheid past correlates strongly with attitudes towards the new political system and its
institutions, including the TRC. Those who feel that life under apartheid was bad, are more in
favour of the new democracy and its institutions. Although economic considerations are
highly relevant whether people consider life under the apartheid past better or worse, the
response to the statement says also much about the general attitudes towards the past political
system. It needs not to be said that the enjoyment of political rights are a significant factor in
determining the citizens" perceptions of quality of life. This is especially reflected in the
response of the African population towards the statement. Unfortunately the liberation of
South African from authoritarian minority rule is not seen as such a contribution towards the
j
quality of life, that it can neutralise negative perceptions of the new democratic order of many
uhiie South Africans. The discourse of the good old days of apartheid may increasingly
isolate white South Africans from their African compatriots. Many black people will rightly
ask. how can they dare to ignore the injustices done to many of us? How can we reconcile
with people, who seem only concerned about their loss of privilege, but not about the
suffering others experienced? Why do white South Africans not admit to the privileges they
20
enjoyed? And why do many of them consider themselves now as the 'victims', although most
of them continue to be better off than all other South Africans in comparative terms? For sure,
the different perception of the apartheid past of white and black South Africans will slow
down reconciliation.
The TRC legislation did not differentiate whether past political crimes were committed by
the liberation movements or the apartheid regime. It was therefore criticised that the TRC
could unintentionally further moral indifference: The fact that crimes committed on both sides
should be investigated and indemnified could, for example, support the notion of the apartheid
repression as a war between two similar parties, were both sides did their wrongs. This
narrative ignores the very fact that political crimes were committed on the one side by a
illegitimate government that disregarded basic human rights to most of its citizens, and on the
other side by a liberation movement which only embarked on an armed struggle after peaceful
attempts to change the political situation in South Africa had failed.
The perception that there is no moral difference between committing acts in the course of
a liberation struggle and crimes to suppress the black liberation movements is still very
popular among white South Africans. When we asked white respondents in a telephone
survey in May 1996 "is there a moral difference between somebody who committed an act as
a freedom fighter and somebody who committed a crime in order to defend the former
political system", 81 percent responded with 'no'. Eleven percent felt that crimes committed
to defend the apartheid system were more justified and only eight percent said that those acts
committed during the freedom struggle were more justified on moral grounds (Theissen
1997:06).
The equalising of apartheid repression with the deeds committed during the armed
liberation struggle might explain, why more and more African respondents started to hold the
view that the TRC should investigate only the abuses of the apartheid regime. While this view
was shared by 23 percent of all African respondents in 1994, this figure increased to 49
percent in 1996. White support for the TRC approach, however, remained relatively stable. In
1994 sevemy-six percent preferred that the crimes of both sides should be investigated, in
1996 this percentage had slightly dropped to 70 percent (Table 5).s
The decrease in support lor the TRC's approach of investigating human rights violations of both sides, may in
part be attributed to the different wording of the questions. The question in the 1DASA survey proposed both
alternatives, while the HSRC survey offered only one statement to which people had to agree or disagree. As
respondents have a general tendency to be nice' to the interviewer and agree more to the statements than they
would disagree if they wouid be confronted with a inverse worded statement, the response pattern to the 1996
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Table 5: Attitudes towards the investigation of crimes of the apartheid government
and the liberation movements
IDASA. 1994'
The Truth Commission should investigate...
Only crimes
in support
of the former
government
(+3)
18%
23%
7%
2%
2%
Have not
thought
about it
(0)
24%
24%
29%
-31 %
23 %
Crimes committed by
both, the liberation
movements and the
former government
(-3)
58 % I
53%
64%
67%
76%
Mear
•1,2
-0 ,9
•1.7
-2,0
•2.2
All
African
Coloured
Indian
White
HSRC, June 1996
The commission of Truth and Reconciliation should investigate
apartheid related abuses of human rights, but not those of the
liberation movements j
mean
Strongly
agree
(+4)
agree
(+2)
Don't
know
(0)
disagree
(-2)
strongly
disagree
(-4)
All
African
Coloured
Indian
White
14% 27% 19% 26% 14% + 0,0
18%
4 %
3%
3%
3 1 %
25%
22%
13%
19%
28 %
36%
13 %
25%
28%
19%
29%
1 7%
15%
2 1 %
' 41 %
+ 0.6
•0,5
-0,7
-1,8
;
 I IDASA 1994) Some people say such a commission should only investigate those crimes committed in support
HI the former government, others say it should investigate all crimes committed by both the former liberation
forces ami supporters of the former government. With which do you agree or haven I you had a chance to think
tihout thiit.'
Public Opinion about the TRC-Amnesty Procedures
In May 1996 Market Research Africa asked South Africans, whether they agree that
..once it person has lohl the Commission about the crime or crimeslthey committed they
should be given amnesty and not prosecuted". Although full disclosure is only one of the
criteria that the Amnesty Committee has to consider in its decision making, it is the essential
precondition for granting amnesty. As most victims of gross human rights violations are
black, one would expect that opposition to amnesty is especially strong among African
survey would probably have been slightly different, if the statement had been worded i'the TRC should
investigate political crimes of both, the liberation movements and the former apartheid government'.
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respondents. Discontent with the amnesty procedures of the TRC was articulated strongly by
family members of prominent slain activists. Understandably they wanted justice to be done.
They argued that perpetrators of gross human rights violations should not be honoured with
impunity and that victims should not loose their right to lay civil claims against them. The
Biko. Mxenge and Ribeiro families therefore challenged the amnesty provisions of the
National Unity and Reconciliation Act before the Constitutional Court. The Court upheld the
TRC-legislation, although some of its sections conflict with current developments in
conventional and customary international law (Dugard 1997).
Contrary to these expectations African respondents were more willing to grant amnesty to
perpetrators of human rights violations (41 percent support, mean: + 0,2) than Coloured,
Indian and White respondents, when they were asked about their opinion in May 1996 (Table
6, first statement). The later disagreed overwhelmingly with the statement that people should
be granted amnesty (means between -0,5 and - 0,8). In general, the public was split on the
amnesty issue (mean: - 0,1). The most impoverished (Less than R499 monthly income) were
most willing to grant amnesty to people who testified (44 % support for amnesty, mean + 0,3)
while the wealthy (more than R 5000 Rand income) were overwhelmingly opposed to
amnesty (50 % against amnesty, mean -0,7). Support for amnesty was strongest among
provinces with predominantly rural black inhabitants - Mpumalanga and Northern Province
showed 54 percent support (mean +0,9) - and lowest in the Western Cape and KwaZulu
Natal. In both provinces respondents were overwhelmingly against amnesty (mean - 0,6). This
can be explained by the high percentage of non-African inhabitants in the Western Cape and
the ongoing political violence in KwaZulu Natal.
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Table 6: Attitudes towards Amnesty
MRA . May 1996 Once a person has told the Commission about the crime or crimes they
committed they should be given amnesty and not prosecuted
strongly tend to neither tend to strongly
agree agree don't know disagree disagree mean
(+4) (+2) (0) (-2) I (-4)
All
African
Coloured
Indian
White
All English-speakers
All Afrikaans-speakers
Income <R 499
Income R500-R1999
Income R 2000-R4999
Income > R 5000
Research Surveys,
October 1996,
only black and white respondents
All
African
White
White/ Afrikaans
White/ English
Income < R6000
Income > R6000
Metro
Small Urban
Rural
Respondents in KZN
17%
22%
5%
10%
1 1 %
7 %
1 1 %
28 %
18%
15%
9 %
19%
19%
23%
18%
19%
18%
2 1 %
16%
20%
20%
17%
23%
23%
2 1 %
1 1 %
25%
24%
2 2 %
26%
23%
22%
24%
22%
16%
4 0 %
41 %
2 7 %
35%
2 8 %
10%
2 0 %
2 5 %
31 %
I
I
i
1
1
i
1
I
i
I
I
i
I
I
I
19%
20%
12%
19%
18%
16%
18%
2 1 %
19%
16%
19%
-0,1
• 0,2
-0,6
-0,8
-0,5
-0,7
-0,4
+ 0,4
+ 0,0
-0,2
-0,7
Do you think that (people who may have done evil things in the pestj should
be given amnesty if they come clean and offer to testify to the Truth
Commission? [
yes
(+3)
48%
49%
39%
41 %
37%
4 8 %
40%
48%
53%
47%
38%
don't know
(0)
24%
24%
27%
27%
26%
24%
24%
20%
22%
30%
36%
no
(-3)
28%
27%
35%
32%
37%
28%
37%
32%
30%
23%
25%
mean
+0,6
+0,6
+0.1
+0.3
+0,0
+0,6
+0,1
+0,5
+0,8
+0.7
+0,4
After the first amnesty hearings were held by the TRC in June 1996, support for the
amnesty process of the TRC increased. Five month later, in October 1996, forty-nine percent
of all African respondents and 39 percent of all white respondents were willing to grant
amnesty to perpetrators "that have come clean and offered to testify before the Truth
Commission' (see Table 6. second statement). The public could now see that perpetrators
would not 'get off easily at the TRC. There would be no pardon without appearing in front of
running TV cameras. The increased support for the TRC amnesty procedures may of course
in part be due to the differently worded statement, which suggested that the perpetrator did not
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only have tell the truth, but had also to 'come clean'. This was probably interpreted by most
respondents as some form of sincere admission of guilt and regret. The personalities of the
first applicants might also have influenced public opinion. The TRC was directed by law to
hear amnesty applications from prisoners first. Justice - understood as criminal punishment -
was already enacted upon them, this process was rather about pardoning people that were
already punished, than granting impunity. With few exceptions mos! prisoners applying for
amnesty also belonged to the liberation movements. One may therefore assume that many
supporters of the liberation movements felt that these applicants are indeed entitled to get
amnesty and should be released from prison as fast as possible.
Besides these possible factors explaining the support for the TRC amnesty process the
intriguing question remains: Why is the amnesty process more supported by African
respondents (mean: + 0,6; October 1996) than all other minority groups, like white
Afrikaners (mean + 0.3) which were more closely aligned to the apartheid state and might
therefore consider to benefit from the amnesty provisions of the TRC-Act?
Probably the acceptance of the TRC amnesty process can only be understood properly by
referring to the concept of ubuntu. Attached to this concept is the belief that individuals who
harmed society may be reintegrated into the community, especially if they have shown
humanity, are willing to restore and serve again the collectivity.
The notion of ubuntu may of course be exploited by politicians, 'nation builders' and
intellectuals to sell political compromise as indigenous virtue. As justice will be sacrificed for
most victims of apartheid, ubuntu may be misused as an ideology to make the poor and
powerless accept their fate. Such an interpretation however would not do justice to importance
of ubuntu in South African political culture. It is definitely wrong to claim that ubuntu is an
imported concept, not rooted in African cultures. The fact that the African, non-metropolitan
poor are most willing to grant amnesty supports this interpretation. If traditional African
values like ubuntu still enjoy high support, then in particular in this population group.
The prevailing culture of ubuntu does not necessarily mean unqualified support for
amnesty. Although more than half of all South Africans think that amnesty may be granted in
certain instances, amnesty is not very popular. Amnesty is only regarded as an exception, that
might be considered for specific cases. This is confirmed by the response to a MarkData
survey conducted in June 1997. Respondents were asked the following question:
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Figure 7: Amnesty or Punishment?
Amnesties
necessary for
reconciliation
19%
Amnesties to
very few only
33%
Source: MarkData. June 1997
,,The TRC is deciding whether or not to
i
grant amnesty - that is freedom from
i
prosecution or release from prison - to
people who confess to {things they have
i
done and express regret i about their deeds.
1
Do you feel that amnesties are necessary to
achieve reconciliation, amnesties should
only be given in a very few cases, or no
amnesties should be given and the people, if
found guilty in a normal court, should be
punished?"
Although the statement suggested that only those perpetrators who show remorse should
be granted amnesty - a precondition not specified in the TRC-Act - nearly four out of ten
South Africans do not like the idea of amnesty at all. (Figure 7). Only 19 percent of all
respondents claim that amnesties are necessary for reconciliation. According to every third
South African amnesty should be restricted to few people, and a considerable percentage of all
respondents (38 percent) favour criminal prosecutions over any amnesty process.
Blaming Phillip • Perceptions of Culpability and Attitudes towards Amnesty
The most interesting insights into public attitudes towards amnesty, can be derived from
the research conducted by the James Gibson and Amanda Gouws (1998). They included an
experimental design into the second wave of a representative national panel study. Each
i
respondent was confronted with a story about Phillip, who had killed opponents during the
i
past political conflict in South Africa. But not everybody got the same story. There were in
total 16 different versions of the story. The stories were manipulated in order to find out under
which conditions South Africans would blame Phillip. Gibson and Gouws manipulated the
actor (in half of all stories Phillip was a member of the armed wing of the MK, in the
j
remaining he was a member of the security branch of the police), the persons that were killed
(either people who had been involved in the struggle about apartheid or people who had not
been involved), whether he was following orders or was in command, and whether his actions
were motivated by hatred against his opponents or not. In total this lead to the 16 different
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versions of the story which were randomly assigned to African, Coloured, Indian and White
respondents.
Version 1 of the story about Phillip read as follows:
Phillip was a member of the Security Branch of the South African police. He was a
senior official in the organisation, he gave orders that others had to follow. As a result
of his actions, people who were not directly involved in the struggle over apartheid
were killed. Phillip says that his actions were motivated by hatred towards those he
killed.
Version 16 read:
Phillip was a member ofMK, the ANC's military wing. He was not a senior official in
the organisation and therefore had to take orders from others higher up in the
organisation. As a result of his actions, people who were directly involved in the
struggle over apartheid were killed. Phillip says that his actions were motivated by the
belief that what he was doing was necessary and justified by the struggle.
Afterwards respondents were asked, whether they would ,,blame Phillip personally for
what happened in this story" on a ten point scale. Extreme responses (1 and 10) were
categorised as completely blameless or complete blame, while the remainders (2-5 and 6-9)
were categorised as blameless and blame respectively. Each interviewee was then asked what
should be done with Phillip. Should he be punished, forgiven, or granted amnesty? Should
Phillip's victims be allowed to sue him in court?
The results of the experiment are shown in Table 7. There are no big differences between
African, Coloured, Indian and White South Africans in the response to all 16 versions of the
Phillip story. In average all population groups tend to attribute the same blame to Phillip.
Coloureds respondents are only slightly less inclined to blame Phillip (mean: 5,80) than
African (mean: 6,18). White (mean: 6,29) and Indian (mean: 6,37) respondents. This picture
changes however dramatically when the actor manipulation is taken into account.
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Table 7: Human Rights Violations and Attribution of Blame
Phillip is.. .
All Vignettes
All South Africans
African
White
Coloured
* Asian
Actor: MK (ANC)
All South Africans
African
White
Coloured
Asian
Actor: Security Force
All South Africans
African
White
Coloured
Asian
Completely
Blameless
(1)
15.4%
17.1 %
5.9 %
17.1 %
6.5 %
21.5%
25.6 %
1.1 %
14.5%
7.1 %
8.9 %
8.0 %
10.0%
20.0 %
5.7 %
Blameless
(2-5)
28.4 %
27.0 %
37.8 %
27.4 %
37.0 %
34.4 %
36.0 %
27.3 %
29.0 %
33.3 %
22.1 %
17.3%
47.0 %
25.5 %
41.4%
To tut
(6-9)
27.2 %
24.3 %
43.6 %
29.1 %
33.8 %
22.8 %
18.3 %
53.4 %
24.2 %
32.1 %
31.8%
30.7 %
35.0 %
34.5 %
35.7 %
Completely to
be blamed
(10)
29.0 %
31.6%
12.8 %
26.5 %
22.7 %
i
I
21.3%
20.0 %
18.2 %
32.3 %
27.4 %
i
37.1 %
44.0 %
8.0 %
20.0 %
17.1 %
Mean
6.18
6.18
6.29
5.80
6.37
5.30
4.92
7.16
5.92
6.54
7.11
7.52
5.52
5.66
6.17
Figure 8: Actor and Attribution of Blame Across the South African Society
Mean response byPhillip is a
member of the... [5.30 ;
MK (ANC)
Security Branch
H All South Africans
a African
Q Coloured
I Indian
• White
Phillip is ...
N = 1237
completly
blameless
2 3 4 5 i 6
blameless
to be
blamed
8 9 10
to be blamed
completely
Source: Gibson & Gouws (1998), Nov-Dec 1997
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In the lower half of Table 7 the responses to the stories in which Phillip is presented as
a MK and a Security Branch policeman are analysed separately. The general response is
that a member of the ANC liberation forces should be blamed less (mean: 5,3) than a
Security Branch officers (mean: 7,11). South Africans are however not completely
uncritical of the ANC's armed struggle. Even among African respondents 48 percent
attribute some blame on Phillip for his actions. On general population level one might
assume that people clearly differentiate between the acts committed during an armed
resistance struggle against a illegitimate regime, and the deeds committed by apartheid
forces. A closer look reveals, however, that this opinion is not at all shared by all
population groups. There is no consensus that the deeds of the armed resistance and the
repression of the apartheid regime have to be judged differently. While 62 percent of all
African respondents say that Phillip as a member of the ANC armed wing is not to be
blamed for his actions (mean: 4,92), only 28 percent of white respondents share this view
(mean: 7,16). The opposite pattern emerges when Phillip is a member of the Security
Branch of the South African police. Only 25 percent of African respondents feel that
Phillip should not be blamed for his actions (mean: 7,52), while 57 percent of white
respondents do not attribute blame to him (mean: 5,52).
The attribution of blame for human rights violations is highly polarised in the South
African society. While African South Africans are inclined to blame MK members less for
their deeds than members of the Security Branch, most white South Africans still regard
the killings of the Security Branch less blameworthy as than those of the armed liberation
force.
Let us turn to the question of amnesty, forgiveness and punishment. After the story was
read to the respondents, each interviewee was asked separately whether they would forgive
Phillip, grant him amnesty, punish him, or allow his victims to sue him in court. By asking
every respondent these questions separately, Gibson and Gouws took into account, that
human beings usually differentiate between forgiveness and amnesty. While forgiveness
has a more moral connotation and refers to a personal act of mercy that can only take place
between a victim and a perpetrator, amnesty is per definition an act of mercy by the state.
Amnesty does not extinct guilt, nor does it encompass forgiveness. Strictly speaking it only
means that the state is refraining from the execution of criminal punishment. Furthermore
Gibson and Gouws distinguished between the granting of amnesty in respect to criminal
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i
liability and the granting of a.-::..-sty in respect to civil liability, as they asked separately
whether Phillip should be granted amnesty and whether the victims should be allowed to
sue Phillip in court.
The willingness to grant amnesty to Phillip and forgive him depends strongly from the
blame they attribute to him (Figure 9). As the attribution of blame! is again highly
dependent on the actor - whether Phillip is a member of MK or the Security Branch -
white and black South Africans tend to disagree with amnesties grantejd to perpetrators
from the former opposition camp. In other words: Tlie consensus who should benefit from
amnesty and who not. is relatively fragile.
I
Other important conclusions can be drawn from the results presented in Figure 9:
i
1. The willingness to forgive is clearly less strong than the acceptance that the state
may grant amnesty to a perpetrator. Although 51 percent of all respondents, who feel that
Phillip is to be blamed for his actions, are willing to grant amnesty to him - the willingness
of those who blame Phillip is significant lower (42 percent).
2. Punishment and Amnesty are not seen as two options which rule each other out.
Mercy is widely accepted, impunity not. On first sight it might appear contradictory that of
those respondents who attribute blame to Phillip, 51 percent are willing to grant amnesty to
him, and 79 percent feel that Phillip should be punished. This means that many
respondents feel that both, punishment and amnesty, are appropriate for Phillip. In other
words: The South African public is more inclined to accept amnesty tb perpetrators who
have already been formally sentenced and punished than granting amnesty without any
punishment. While the first type of amnesty is an act of mercy, as the indemnified person
has already been found guilty and started to serve his sentence, the second type of amnesty
is impunity. Here the perpetrator was never formally sentenced, and was granted amnesty
without any punishment.
j
3. The public feels that victims and their familv members should be allowed to suej
perpetrators for damages. More than two thirds of all respondents (68 percent) share this
i
feeling. Mile criminal punishment may be spared, restorative justice must be done.
i
Interestingly, this public sentiment depends less on the degree of blame attributed to
Phillip. Still 44 percent of those who claim that Phillip is completely blameless, feel that
i
the victims and their families should be allowed to sue him in court. By implication public
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consensus in respect to civil liability is less polarised across racial and political cleavages
in the South African society. Although many respondents are willing to grant amnesty in
respect to criminal liability (58 percent), there is hardly public support for amnesty in
respect to civil liability. The overwhelming sentiment is: Justice is not sacrificed, because
perpetrators are not punished -justice is sacrificed, because victims are not restituted.
The South African state indemnified successful amnesty applicants from criminal
liability and civil liability. Despite this, the South African state did not find it necessary to
provide an effective remedy to victims of gross human rights violations to date. With the
exception of small interim reparations, most victims have not received any form of
compensation. This stands in contrast to an amnesty process which is already ongoing for
about three years. The recommendations of the TRC's Reparation and Rehabilitation
Committee are as also well known since October 1997. Here the TRC-Act and the current
state practise is clearly at odds with public opinion and international human rights law. It
remains to be seen whether this problem will be addressed by the new government.
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Figure 9: Blame and Attitudes towards Amnesty, Forgiveness and Punishment.
Phillip should...
100%,
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%-
10%
0%
fj§ All respondents
Respondents
who feel that Phillip is ...
Q completely blameless
Q blameless
g to be blamed
H completely to be blamed
Be forgiven Granted amnesty Be punished Allowed to be sued
Source: Gibson & Gouws (1998), Nov / Dec 1997
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Summary
Although the apartheid past was experienced differently by South Africans from divergent
cultural backgrounds, all South Africans will have to relate to the common history of
apartheid. Historic perceptions might be different, but not all of them have the same right to
be accepted. The glorification and justification of the apartheid past is problematic, as it
questions the commitment to the new democratic order and may impede reconciliation across
former political and cultural cleavages.
Although public interest in the TRC process was strong, it differed considerable between
white and black South Africans. The average ratings of the TRC Special Report show that the
TRC went to the heart of most black South Africans. White interest in the TRC process
dropped however significantly over time.
The TRC was especially welcomed by African respondents. They were also more
confident that the TRC would be able to find out what really happened. White South Africans
followed the TRC process rather with mistrust.
While most non-white South Africans consider themselves as victims of the apartheid
past, only few of their white fellow citizens share this feeling. At the same time most white
South Africans do not consider themselves as beneficiaries of apartheid. This perception
contributes to the 'white' resistance against redistribution measures. Although most white
South Africans have not lost their privileged position in South African society, many feel that
they are the 'victims' of the new dispensation. The perception that 'things were better under
apartheid' contributes to a uncritical glorification of the apartheid past.
Although amnesty in individual cases is supported by most South Africans, there is
considerable disagreement who should benefit from such amnesty. There is no consensus, to
which extent the ANC and the former government should be blamed for past human rights.
In general South Africans are less inclined to free perpetrators from civil liability than
from criminal punishment. Justice is not sacrificed, because perpetrators are not punished -
justice is sacrificed, the victims and their families are not restituted. It remains to be seen
whether the South Africans state will respond adequately to this challenge and implement
speedily the recommended reparation policy of the TRC.
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